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IGNORANCE IS BLISS: A COMMENT ON
PA VLOVICH V. SUPERIOR COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pavlovich v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court
refused to find personal jurisdiction based upon the "defendant's
knowledge that his tortious conduct may harm industries centered in
California." 2 Although the defendant, Matthew Pavlovich, knew that
industries centered in California would be harmed by his actions, the
court found that he did not know precisely whom he was harming.
3
Applying the Calder effects test,4 the court found that Pavlovich had
not expressly directed his conduct at the forum state because he only
suspected, but did not know, that the entity his actions harmed
resided in California.5
Pavlovich was decided by a bare majority 4-3 vote.6 This
comment will summarize the majority opinion, then critically
analyze it. Justice Baxter's strong dissent, joined by Chief Justice
George and Justice Chin, will be discussed when relevant to the
analysis of the majority's holding.
II. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS OF PAVLOVICH
A. Background Facts and Procedural History
Matthew Pavlovich was a computer engineering student at
Purdue University in Indiana when he founded and operated the
LiVid video project (LiVid).7 By the time the California Supreme
1. 29 Cal. 4th 262, 58 P.3d 2, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002) [hereinafter
Pavlovich #2].
2. Id. at 278, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343.
3. See id. at 275-76, 58 P.3d at 11-12, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340-41.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 278, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
343.
6. See id. at 262, 58 P.3d at 2, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329-30.
7. See id. at 266, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
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Court ruled on the case, Pavlovich had moved to Texas and become
president of his own consulting company, Media Driver LLC.8
LiVid, 9 which stands for "Linux' 0 Video and DVD," operated a
website. 11
Pavlovich's goal was to use the LiVid site to encourage the
development of video and DVD (Digital Versatile Disc) support for
Linux by providing a central location for users and developers to
"'combine the resources and the efforts of the various individuals
that were working on related things.""0
2
Pavlovich and others sought to design a method for developing
DVD players that would work on Linux systems. 13  One of the
obstacles faced in developing an unlicensed Linux DVD player was
the Content Scrambling System (CSS) used by the DVD industry to
encrypt and protect copyrighted material-particularly major motion
pictures-from playback or copying in the absence of the decryption
algorithms and keys. 14 A program called DeCSS15 was developed to
8. See id.
9. Contrary to the case reporter, the successor website capitalizes the last
"d", i.e., LiViD. For consistency, I will use the case reporter spelling. See
LiViD, The Linux Video and DVD Project, at http://www.linuxvideo.org (last
updated Nov. 1, 2001).
10. Linux is a Unix-type computer operating system whose source code is
"freely available to everyone." Linux Online! at http://www.linux.org/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2003). Linux was developed in 1991 by Linus Torvald, who at
that time was a student at the University of Helsinki in Finland. See Linux
Online!, What is Linux?, at http://www.linux.org/info/index.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2003).
11. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 266, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
333.
12. Id. at 267, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
13. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, DVD Update-REVEALED:
DeCSS Led to Competing Linux DVD Player, at http://www.eff.org/
IP/Video/DVD_Updates/2000072 l_dvd_update.html (July 21, 2000)
[hereinafter Revealed].
14. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 266, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
333.
15. CSS may actually not prevent the copying of DVDs, but in the course
of performing its function, DeCSS may sidestep other protections that do
prevent copying. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 438
n.5 (2d Cir. 2001). At the time DeCSS was developed, Linux did not support
any licensed DVD players. See id. at 437. For a history of the development of
DeCSS, along with an insightful background discussion of how CSS performs
its function, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d at 436-40.
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circumvent CSS and allow an unlicensed Linux DVD player to be
developed and to decrypt DVDs.
16
The source code for DeCSS was posted to the LiVid website by
October 1999.17 Pavlovich did not seek or obtain a license to use
CSS technology in developing a Linux-based DVD player. 18 In
addition to his work with LiVid, Pavlovich was also known as a
leader of the "open source" movement.19 Followers of the open
source movement believe that source code should be "freely
available for others to view, amend, and adapt."20  Software
producers such as Microsoft operate under the traditional "closed
model" and allow few programmers access to their source code.
21
Publishing DeCSS was consistent with Pavlovich's open source
philosophy, making it available for all to see and use.
DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. (DVD CCA) brought suit
in California state court against Pavlovich alleging that the website
posting of DeCSS misappropriated trade secrets "because the
'DeCSS program . . . embodies, uses, and/or is a substantial
derivation of confidential proprietary information which DVD CCA
licenses.'
22
DVD CCA was founded in December 1998 by the DVD
industry as a nonprofit trade association with a mission "to control
and administer licensing of the CSS technology., 23 It became the
"sole licensing entity" for CSS technology shortly after December
1999.24 Although incorporated under Delaware law, 2' DVD CCA
16. See Revealed, supra note 13.
17. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 267, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
333. The website posting at subject in this case could formerly be found at
http://www.livid.on.openprojects.net. However, that site is no longer
accessible.
18. See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912 (2001)
superceded by 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002) [hereinafter Pavlovich #1].
19. See id.
20. Richard Poynder, The Open Source Movement: Does This Software
Provide a Viable, User-Friendly Alternative to Proprietary Solutions?,
INFORMATION TODAY, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.infotoday.com/
it/octO 1 /poynder.htm.
21. See id.
22. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 267, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333-
34.
23. Id. at 266, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
24. Id.
25. See id.
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claimed that Pavlovich caused harm in California, its principal place
of business.
26
In response to the lawsuit, Pavlovich filed a motion to quash
service of process, claiming that California courts did not have
personal jurisdiction over him.27 The trial court denied the motion,
and Pavlovich appealed. The court of appeal refused to issue a writ
of mandate, but the California Supreme Court granted review,
transferring the matter back to the court of appeal with directions to
vacate the order denying mandate, and to order the trial court to
show cause why the motion to quash service should not be granted. 28
The court of appeal then issued an opinion where it held that
Pavlovich had "purposefully availed himself of forum benefits under
the Calder effects test,'' 29 and it was reasonable for the trial court to
exercise personal (specific) jurisdiction over him. 30 The court found
this consistent "with notions of fair play and substantial justice under
the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 3 1
Pavlovich appealed to the California Supreme Court, which granted
review.3
2
B. Facts Pertinent to the Question of Personal Jurisdiction
Pavlovich did not have any of the traditional contacts with
California under which personal jurisdiction might be found. He did
not reside, work, own real property, have a telephone listing, bank
account, or place of business in California.33 By the time his case
had been brought on appeal, Pavlovich had started his own
technology consulting company in Texas.34 Neither he nor his
company had any business contacts with California.35
26. See id. at 275, 58 P.3d at 10-11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339-40.
27. See id. at 267, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334.
28. See Pavlovich #1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 2001),
superceded by 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002).
29. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 268, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334.
30. See id.
31. Pavlovich #1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 918 (2001), superceded by 127
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002).
32. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 268, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
334.
33. See id. at 266, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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The LiVid website provided information only, consisting of "a
single page with text and links to other Web sites." 36 It was not
interactive. 37 Visitors to the site could not exchange information
with the site operators. 38 Furthermore, the site did not transact or
solicit any business. 39 Aside from its accessibility in California,
LiVid had no traditional contacts with California.4 °
In deposition testimony, Pavlovich admitted knowing of an
organization that licensed DVD technology, and that he had heard
"you've got to apply for a license and whatnot."'41 He also knew that
DeCSS had been created through "reverse engineering" of CSS 42 and
was probably illegal.43 He admitted that DeCSS facilitated the
pirating of DVD's and that pirating was illegal.44
Particularly pertinent to the lower court's finding of personal
jurisdiction, Pavlovich admitted in deposition testimony that he knew
that the motion picture industry, which relied on CSS to protect its
copyrighted material, was centered in California.45 He also admitted
knowing that the computer technology industry had a dominant
presence in California.4 6 He identified Silicon Valley, California as
one of the two technology hot spots in the United States, the other
being Texas.
47
III. THE CALIFORmA SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
The California Supreme Court determined that California courts
could not exercise jurisdiction over Pavlovich based on the facts
36. Id. at 266-67, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
37. See id. at 267, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Pavlovich #1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912 (2001), superceded by 127
Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002).
42. See id.
43. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 267, 58 P.3d at 5, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
333.
44. See Pavlovich #1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 912 (2001), superceded by
127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 915-16.
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present in his case. 48  Noting that California's long-arm statute4 9
allows California courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits
of due process under the United States Constitution, the court applied
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington50 to determine whether Pavlovich had sufficient contacts
with California such that asserting jurisdiction would "not violate
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 5
Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific.52 General
jurisdiction exists when a defendant's contacts with the forum state
"are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic' such that the
defendant can expect to be "haled into court in that state" on causes
of action that are unrelated to its contacts with the state.53 The
California Supreme Court observed that DVD CCA had not alleged
that California courts had general jurisdiction over Pavlovich, which
left it to consider only the question of specific personal jurisdiction.5 4
Tracing the United States Supreme Court's development of
specific personal jurisdiction,55  the court considered "'the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'
' 56
In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant, that court must consider a three-part test. First, did
the defendant "purposefully [avail] himself or herself of forum
benefits"? 57 Second, is the controversy "related to or [arising] out of
48. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 268, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
334.
49. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2002).
50. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
51. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 268, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334
(citations omitted).
52. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086
(9th Cir. 2000).
53. See id.
54. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 269, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
335.
55. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Int'l Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. at 310.
56. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 269, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335
(citations omitted).
57. Id. at 269, 58 P.3d at 7, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
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[the] defendant's contacts with the forum"? 58  Third, would "the
assertion of personal jurisdiction . .. comport with notions of fair
play and substantial justice"?5 9
The beginning and end of the California Supreme Court's
analysis dealt with the purposeful availment prong of the test.
Pavlovich claimed to have no contacts with California, and thus had
never availed himself of forum benefits. 60 As an alternative means
for assessing purposeful availment, the United States Supreme Court
has provided the Calder effects test.61 The effects test substitutes for
actual contact with the forum state when dealing with cases of
defamation.
62
In Calder v. Jones, the Court found that California was both the
focal point of the defendant's action and the focal point of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff.63  Thus, the Court approved of the
California court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant who had no prior contacts with California.
64
In applying the effects test to the business tort in Pavlovich, the
California Supreme Court addressed the two requirements that
almost all circuits had adopted:65  1) the defendant must have
"expressly aimed at or target[ed]" intentional conduct at the forum
state, and 2) the defendant must have known that "his intentional
conduct would cause harm in the forum."66 DVD CCA contended
that this test was met, as Pavlovich knew his intentional posting of
DeCSS targeted the licensing entity as well as "the motion picture,
58. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
59. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
60. See Id.
61. See Id.
62. See id.
63. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
64. See id. at 791.
65. See Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002); United States v.
Swiss American Bank Ltd., 274 F.3d 610 (1st Cir. 2001); Bancroft & Masters,
Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Wien Air Alaska,
Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1999); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG,
155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d
617 (4th Cir. 1997); Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir.
1995); Hicklin Eng'g, Inc. v. Aidco, Inc., 959 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1992).
66. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 271, 58 P.3d at 8, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336-
37.
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computer and consumer electronics industries" located in California,
where the harm would be felt.
67
Noting that the Seventh Circuit in Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy68 had
focused solely on the location where the harm-and thus, the tort-
had occurred, the California Supreme Court found Janmark in
conflict with the seminal holding of World-Wide Volkswagen.69 The
court observed that it is not enough that the injury in the forum state
be foreseeable, but that the defendant should be able to reasonably
foresee, based on his or her "'conduct and connection with the forum
State[,] ... being haled into court there.'
70
Complicating the court's analysis was the nature of Pavlovich's
contact with California-the posting of DeCSS's source code on
LiVid's Internet website, which was accessible by any person
anywhere with Internet access, including California.71 Although the
California Supreme Court had not yet considered how personal
jurisdiction would be affected when the only contact was through the
Internet, the court observed that other jurisdictions 72  had
implemented a sliding scale approach, finding no grounds to exercise
personal jurisdiction from passive sites that only provide
information.73
LiVid's site was passive, providing information only, with no
interactive features.74 Furthermore, no evidence had been offered
showing that a California resident had visited or downloaded from
the website.75 The court decided that the passive website alone was
insufficient for establishing specific personal jurisdiction.76
67. Id. at 275, 58 P.3d at 11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.
68. 132 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1997).
69. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 272, 58 P.3d at 9, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
70. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
71. See id. at 273, 58 P.3d at 10, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
72. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.
1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997). Zippo created a sliding scale based on the "nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Zippo, 952 F.
Supp. at 1124. Cybersell applied a simlar standard based on the amount of
interactivity. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418.
73. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 274, 58 P.3d at 10, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
339.
74. See id.
75. See id. An interesting question, outside the scope of this paper, is
whether the geographical location of website visitors can be ascertained. The
1740
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Because the website itself proved insufficient to provide the
necessary minimum contacts on which to base specific jurisdiction,
the court considered the alternative argument that Pavlovich's
activities satisfied the first prong of the effects test.77 The court
examined three different possibilities on which to base a finding that
Pavlovich's posting intentionally targeted individuals or businesses
within California.
78
First, DVD CCA alleged that Pavlovich knew that a licensing
entity existed that owned the licensing rights to CSS.79 The court
found that this provided an inadequate basis for two reasons: there
was no evidence that Pavlovich was aware that DVD CCA had its
principal place of business in California, and due to an ironic
sequence of events, DVD CCA was not administering licenses to
CSS technology until December 1999, nearly two months after
DeCSS had been posted to LiVid's website.8 ° Pavlovich could not
have known about DVD CCA's interest when the misappropriated
code was posted and thus, could not have intentionally targeted DVD
CCA.81
Second, DVD CCA alleged that Pavlovich knew that the motion
picture industry was centered in California and that DVD pirating of
copyrighted movies would harm that industry.82 The court expressed
doubt that those effects were relevant because the cause of action at
issue was not "the illegal pirating of copyrighted motion pictures. ' 83
Specific jurisdiction depends upon the relationship between the
defendant's "activity in the forum" and the "particular cause of
web server that services a website can "log the originating Internet protocol
address of visiting users." Terrence Berg, www.wildwest.gov: The Impact of
the Internet on State Power to Enforce the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1305, n.91
(2000). However, that address may correspond to the geographical location of
the Internet service provider ("ISP") that the visitor uses, rather than the
location of the website visitor. The ISP and the website visitor may be located
in different states. See id.
76. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 274, 58 P.3d at 10, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
339.
77. See id. at 275-78, 58 P.3d at 11-13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340-43.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 275, 58 P.3d at 11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 276, 58 P.3d at 11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
83. Id.
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action.' 84  Regardless, the court found that even though it was
foreseeable that others might use DeCSS to illegally pirate
copyrighted movies, Pavlovich had done nothing to encourage that
behavior.85 His awareness that someone might unlawfully utilize
DeCSS was too attenuated to show express targeting.
86
Third, DVD CCA alleged that Pavlovich knew that California
was a base for computer industries and consumer electronics, and
should have known that many licensees of CSS had their place of
business in California.87 DVD CCA reasoned that Pavlovich should
have known his posting of DeCSS would harm those California
businesses.
88
The court found this analysis unpersuasive because the evidence
did not demonstrate that Pavlovich knew CSS licensees were in
California, but merely that he "should have guessed" they were.
89
Using a test of "mere foreseeability" would result in specific
jurisdiction in California over any defendant whose intentional tort
affected industries in the state. 90 The court refused to adopt such a
broad interpretation in applying the effects test.91
The court conceded that foreseeability of the effects of a
defendant's actions in the forum state can be considered in
92conjunction with other evidence of express targeting. However, the
court found no support for the proposition that an allegation that a
defendant "should have known" that potential harm might befall a
plaintiff was alone sufficient to establish the express targeting
required in a finding of personal jurisdiction. 93  The basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction that DVD CCA proposed was not that
Pavlovich should have known that his conduct could harm a
California plaintiff, but that his conduct could harm "industries
associated with that plaintiff., 94  The court felt that basing
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 277, 58 P.3d at 12-13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
90. See id. 278, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 277, 58 P.3d at 12, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
93. See id.
94. Id.
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jurisdiction on such an expansive application of the effects test would
result in the elimination of "the purposeful availment requirement" in
most intentional tort cases and chose to decline jurisdiction.95
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RAISED IN PAVLOVICH
This analysis will look critically at the reasoning employed by
the California Supreme Court in declining jurisdiction. To find
purposeful availment under the two-part version of the effects test, a
court must find that the defendant (1) directed intentional conduct at
the forum, and (2) had knowledge that the intentional conduct would
cause harm there.
96
First, the court set the hurdle too high by requiring actual
knowledge of the name and location of the entity before express
aiming or knowledge of harm could be found. Second, the court
ignored that the intentional aiming element was met by a
combination of Pavlovich's intent to facilitate others' use of DeCSS
to cause harm in California and his intent to disclose a trade secret
9 7
belonging to California businesses. Those express targeting contacts,
coupled with Pavlovich's use of a website that could be accessed in
California, provided sufficient contact with California such that the
effects test should have been satisfied under the facts in Pavlovich.
A. Knowledge
The California Supreme Court has set an excessively high bar
for fulfilling the "knowledge" requirement of the effects test. A
defendant must have actual knowledge of the name of the entity and
that its principal place of business is in California before the
California Supreme Court will find personal jurisdiction in California
under the effects test. Here, Pavlovich knew that a licensing entity
existed and knew that the businesses that benefited from that license
were in California, but those two facts were not enough for the court
to find that he targeted his conduct at the forum.98
95. See id. at 278, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
96. See id. at 271, 58 P.3d at 8, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336-37.
97. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act protects individuals from the harm of
disclosure of trade secrets. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (West
2002).
98. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 279-81, 58 P.3d at 14, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
343 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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Applying the court's analysis, a defendant can avoid personal
jurisdiction under the effects test by targeting an entire industry but
staying ignorant of the exact name and location of the entities within
that industry that the defendant seeks to harm. This result is
problematic. When facing a trade secret misappropriation claim, the
defendant can acknowledge that he or she knew that someone owned
the "trade secret," but deny knowing the name and principal place of
business of the plaintiff, and thereby avoid specific jurisdiction. If
multiple defendants live in different states, plaintiffs would be forced
to carry out duplicative legal actions in multiple locations.
Although the effects test has been applied to find specific
jurisdiction over out of state tortfeasors when the entity targeted was
a corporation,99 the court was unwilling to extend the test to
industries. 100 The court was concerned that this "would effectively
subject all intentional tortfeasors whose conduct may harm industries
in California to jurisdiction in California."
10'
The court's attempt to draw a bright line between industries and
actual entities, even if practical, violates the maxim that personal
jurisdiction cannot "turn upon mechanical tests."'1 2  In fact, the
California Supreme Court had already observed in Cornelison v.
Chaney'0 3 that determining jurisdiction requires a "flexible approach
grounded in the quality and nature of the activity of the defendant in
the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over him, fairness to the
parties, and the orderly administration of the law."'
0 4
A defendant's knowledge that his or her tortious conduct will
harm an entire industry should not be automatically dismissed from
the equation. As the dissent in Pavlovich properly noted:
[I]t cannot matter that [the] defendant may not have known
or cared about the exact identities or precise locations of
99. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding personal jurisdiction in California where an individual aimed its
tortious conduct at a specific California company).
100. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 278, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
342-43.
101. Id.
102. Vons Co. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 434, 463, 926 P.2d 1085,
1104, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 918 (1996) (citing International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
103. 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976).
104. Id. at 150, 545 P.2d at 268, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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each individual target .... By acting with the broad intent
to harm industries he knew were centered or substantially
present in this state, [the] defendant forged sufficient
'minimum contacts' with California.1
0 5
Here, it was clear that Pavlovich had targeted the movie and
computer technology industries that relied upon CSS technology. In
his deposition, he admitted knowing that both industries were
centered in California.' 0 6 There was evidence that he had been put
on notice that release of the trade secret-the decoding of CSS-
would harm those industries.
10 7
Despite the court's fears over expanding personal jurisdiction
based on mere knowledge that an industry is located in a certain
geographic region, the court could have narrowed the test by
requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that there was conduct
intentionally targeted at an entire industry. This is distinguishable
from a situation in which an intentional tortfeasor targets one
company within an industry centered in California. Knowledge that
an industry is present in California need not imply that any particular
business within that industry is also present. °8 Perhaps the court
could have limited the sweep of the knowledge component by
finding that where the entire industry is targeted by the conduct-
and not just one business in the industry-the knowledge that the
industry is primarily centered in California would satisfy that
component of the effects test.
105. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 279, 58 P.3d at 14, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343
(Baxter, J., dissenting).
106. See Pavlovich #1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 915-16 (Ct. App. 2001),
superceded by 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002) (reproducing partial transcript
from Pavlovich's deposition).
107. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 283, 58 P.3d at 16, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
346 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (summarizing a posting on LiVid's website
warning that "CSS was a licensed trade secret... [designed] to prevent the
pirating of movies from DVD's, that Hollywood was 'paranoid' about pirating,
and that if CSS were 'cracked,' there was a 'good chance' no new movie titles
would be released on DVD.").
108. See, e.g., Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal Canadian Golf Ass'n., 125 F.
Supp. 2d 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding no personal jurisdiction over a
Canadian defendant in California where the defendant knew that the golf
equipment manufacturing industry was centered in part in California, but did
not know that plaintiff's business was actually located in California).
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B. Intentional Aiming
1. The intentionally aimed harm and the cause of
action do not have to be identical
The majority in Pavlovich was incorrect in dismissing the
relevance of the harmful effects of third-party pirating. The court
questioned whether the harmful effects of third-party pirating of
DVD's were relevant because DVD CCA did not "assert a cause of
action premised on the illegal pirating of copyrighted motion
pictures."' 10 9 However, the pirating was offered to show the harmful
effects of the intentional targeting, which substituted for forum
contacts. DVD CCA did not have to prove a strict one-to-one
correlation between the forum contacts and the cause of action.
Purposeful availment is analyzed within the context of "the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation."' 1  As the court properly
noted in Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., the cause of
action does not have to perfectly correspond with the "nonresident's
forum contacts." ''  Here, the defendant's forum contacts are the
resulting harm in California from his intentional distribution of
DeCSS.
Pavlovich knew he would cause harm to the movie industry by
posting a trade secret that allowed others to illegally pirate
copyrighted movies. 112 "[A]s long as the claim bears a substantial
connection to the nonresident's forum contacts, the exercise of
specific jurisdiction is appropriate."1 13 Pavlovich's misappropriation
and distribution of DeCSS trade secrets has a substantial connection
to the resulting harm caused when others pirate DVDs. 114
109. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 276, 58 P.3d at 11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
341.
110. Id. at 269, 58 P.3d at 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335 (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984), quoting Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
111. 14 Cal. 4th 434, 452, 926 P.2d 1085, 1096-97, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899,
910 (1996).
112. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 288, 58 P.3d at 19-20, 127 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 350-51 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
113. Vons Co., 14 Cal. 4th at 452, 926 P.2d at 1096, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910
(1996).
114. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 276, 58 P.3d at 12, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
340.
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The court felt Pavlovich's awareness that someone "might"
unlawfully utilize DeCSS was too attenuated to show express
targeting."15  However, the dissent takes the better view that
Pavlovich intended the direct consequences of his actions. 1 6 He
posted a trade secret which allowed those who downloaded it to use
it for illegal copying.
Courts have found personal jurisdiction based on third-party
contacts, such as those of a co-conspirator."i 7 Pavlovich's posting of
the DeCSS could be compared to a tacit conspiracy. Although
Pavlovich did not actively encourage others to copy DVDs illegally,
neither did he discourage them.' 18 His posting of the trade secret is
enough encouragement so that those harms resulting from third-party
misuse should be attributed to him for purposes of personal
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court's concern that the foreseeability of third-
party actions was not the type of foreseeability that due process
required was misplaced. The foreseeability required by due process
was satisfied here in that the defendant could foresee being haled
into this jurisdiction based on his forum contacts. Under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act,119 misappropriation of a trade secret
includes "[d]isclosure... of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent."'120 The disclosure itself is the harm that is
protected against because disclosure allows third parties who have no
right to do so to use the trade secret. It was Pavlovich's disclosure of
the California-based movie and computer industries' trade secret-
and the harm done to them because of that disclosure, including
third-party use of that secret-that intentionally targeted California
and became the contact that made being haled into California courts
foreseeable.
115. See id. at 276-77, 58 P.3d at 12, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340-41.
116. See id. at 294, 58 P.3d at 24, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355 (Baxter, J.,
dissenting).
117. See Cleft of the Rock Found. v. Wilson, 992 F. Supp. 574, 581-82
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).
118. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 276, 58 P.3d at 12, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
341.
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426-3426.11 (West 2002).
120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (b)(2) (West 2002).
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2. Intentional aiming has to target the forum
and not necessarily the plaintiff
The court was wrong when it required that the harm intended
had to be aimed at the named plaintiff. The court found that because
the date that DVD CCA started administrating the license was
subsequent to Pavlovich's posting, Pavlovich could not have known
that DVD CCA held the license, so he could not have intentionally
aimed his conduct at DVD CCA. 12 1 In doing so, the court ignored
that DVD CCA had been formed by the initial holders of the CSS
trade secret, "the motion picture and DVD industries," and was their
successor in interest.'22 In actuality, Pavlovich knew that the movie
industry and the computer industries, both of which were involved in
the development of CSS, were located in California. 23
Again, the court is imposing a rigid requirement that is
inconsistent with its own standards. 24 Other courts have held that a
defendant does not have to aim at the plaintiff as long as the
defendant intentionally aims his conduct at the forum.125  Here,
Pavlovich intentionally aimed at the movie and computer industries
centered in California, and should expect to be haled into California
courts based on that contact.
C. Operation of a Passive Website Can Be a Forum Contact
In considering intentional targeting under the effects test, the
intent of a poster of a website to provide access to his or her website
in all forums is a contact that should be considered, regardless of the
site's passive nature.
121. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 275, 58 P.3d at 11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
340.
122. Id. at 281, 58 P.3d at 14-15, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344 (Baxter, J.,
dissenting).
123. See Pavlovich #1, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 915-16 (Ct. App. 2001),
superceded by 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002) (reproducing partial transcript
from Pavlovich's deposition).
124. See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 150, 545 P.2d 264, 268, 127
Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1976) (implying that California has rejected application of
rigid tests in evaluating questions of personal jurisdiction as consistent with
International Shoe).
125. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir.
1998).
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The California Supreme Court separated its analysis of the
website's passive nature from its analysis of the intentional aiming
requirement of the effects test.126 The court noted that other courts
had found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on an
Internet website "'is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on the website." ' 127 The court dismissed the contacts
inherent in a passive website and failed to incorporate those contacts
into its analysis.
128
As seen in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,129 a magazine
distributed in a forum can provide sufficient minimum contacts to
justify personal jurisdiction over a cause of action for defamation.
130
Although magazines mailed, distributed, or sold within a forum state
are different from a passive website that is accessed in a forum state,
a comparison of the two aptly illustrates the problem of applying a
rigid rule that exempts passive websites from the minimum contacts
analysis.
A publisher who mails, distributes, or sells its magazines in a
forum state has committed an intentional act to establish minimum
contacts with that forum such that it should expect to be haled into
court in that forum based on those contacts.' 31  In contrast, a
publisher that only distributes in New York, but whose magazine is
carried to Florida and who has no other contacts with Florida, is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida because the intervening act
of a third party has swept the magazine within the forum.'
3 2
With a passive website, the intentional act takes place when the
poster posts its message to a website, making it available for anyone
in the world to access it. Under the current theory that most courts
126. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 273-74, 58 P.3d at 10, 127 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 339.
127. Id. at 274, 58 P.3d at 10, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339 (quoting Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
128. See id.
129. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
130. See id. at 774-75.
131. See id. at 781.
132. "[M]ere 'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State."' World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298
(1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
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follow, a passive website, without more, is not enough to establish
specific jurisdiction in any forUm. 133 Thus, the only place that the
poster can be sued is in a state that has general jurisdiction over the
poster. The courts do not consider the location of those who access
the website when looking at minimum contacts.' 34 Those contacts
are seen as the actions of a third party whose unilateral conduct
cannot establish minimum contacts and are distinguished from those
contacts created when a magazine is provided to residents of a forum
by a publisher.
It is at this point that the comparison is most illustrative. As
opposed to a magazine, the only way a passive website can be
brought into a forum is by the unilateral activity of someone
accessing it. Yet, that very access is what posters intended when
they place their messages for the world to see, just as the magazine
publisher who puts its magazines on a rack for sale or free
distribution wants forum residents to buy or take a copy.
Courts find themselves in a difficult situation when dealing with
the Internet. If a passive website, standing alone, can generate
minimum contacts anywhere, then someone who posts onto the Web
can be haled into court anywhere in the world to answer for the
content of his or her message.' 35 That view of personal jurisdiction
is simply too broad for the courts to accept. On the other hand, when
a website is truly passive, the poster can only be sued in a court with
general jurisdiction, 136 requiring that all potential plaintiffs travel to
the poster's state to file a lawsuit against the poster, thereby
forfeiting the benefit and convenience of suing in the forum where
harm from the posting occurred."'
Either always finding purposeful availment based on a passive
website, or never finding it, presents an extreme result. When a
court has to assess contacts within a forum, the flexible nature of the
current tests for personal jurisdiction invites the court to discard a
bright-line analysis in favor of a balanced approach.
133. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 274, 58 P.3d at 10, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
339.
134. See id.
135. See id. (citing GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199
F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
136. For an explanation of general jurisdiction, see supra Part III.
137. See Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 279, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
343 (noting that DVD CCA can still pursue Pavlovich in Texas).
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In preferring a finding of no contacts based on a passive website,
courts must recognize that the poster's intent is that the world should
have access to his or her message. In taking on the benefits of
world-wide distribution, the poster should also take on at least some
of the risk of being drawn to a foreign court to answer for harm
resulting from the posting. It is conceivable that if posters become
concerned over the possibility that out-of-state courts might find
personal jurisdiction over them, computer programs will be
developed to allow posters to select who can access their websites
based on geographical location.
Thus, a balanced approach that takes into account the reality of
the poster's intent-that residents of all forums have access to what
he or she posts-needs to be developed. Precedent for this analysis
can be found in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore
Football Club.138 There, the court found that the defendant had
"established minimum contacts with Indiana, among other ways,
through nationwide cable telecasts of football games."' 39 Much like
the Internet, cable does not reach a forum without the intervention of
a third party who subscribes to the cable service, turns on the
television set, and selects the appropriate channel.
In considering whether a defendant has expressly aimed at the
plaintiffs forum, courts should consider the contacts created by a
passive website and factor those in against the defendant in satisfying
the express aiming requirement. Here, such considerations should
have resulted in a finding that California courts had jurisdiction over
Pavlovich in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems unusual that the California Supreme Court went out of
its way to disclaim jurisdiction in Pavlovich. The court was clear
that it felt uncomfortable in providing whole industries with the
ability to hale individuals into court in the jurisdiction in which the
industries reside.'
40
138. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
139. Pavlovich #2, 29 Cal. 4th at 290, 58 P.3d at 21, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352
(Baxter, J., dissenting) (summarizing the holding in Indianapolis Colts).
140. See id. at 278, 58 P.3d at 13, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342.
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Historically, California has been at the forefront of expanding
personal jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has
reviewed many California cases that expanded personal jurisdiction,
upholding some and denying others. 142 Ironically, Calder, which
gave rise to the effects test, was a California case. The court's
holding in Pavlovich may indicate a change in California's liberal
approach to personal jurisdiction.
It is also possible that the court did not want California to
become a magnet for all movie or computer industry-related cases.
Much like the New York legislature did when it excepted certain
defamation suits from its long-arm statute,143 the California Supreme
Court may have used its judicial pruning shears to ensure that
California's courts were not overloaded with all movie and computer
industry cases.
However, it is equally arguable that a jurisdiction should offer
its residents a judicial forum in which their cases can be heard. An
out-of-state tortfeasor should not be able to elude jurisdiction
because the tortfeasor stayed ignorant of the exact entity harmed by
its conduct. Pavlovich expressly aimed at industries in California,
knowing that his intentional disclosure of their trade secret would
cause harm to those industries in California. He should be subject to
jurisdiction in California to answer for his acts.
Gena M. Stinnett
141. See Vons Co. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 434, 926 P.2d 1085, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (1996); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d
893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
142. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
143. Granting personal jurisdiction in New York over one who "commits a
tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from
the act." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2002) (emphasis added).
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